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Summary findings
In principle,  financial  regulation  seeks  to remedy  Basle  franiework  of solvency  regulations  directly  opposes
recognized  deficiencies  and inefficiencies  in a nation's  their short-run political  embraceability.
economic,  political,  and bureaucratic  incentive  Kane  believes  that what most urgently  need to be
structu:es.  But  the social  urgency  of particular  financial  transferred  to developing  countries  are elements  of
policy  problems  differ according  to a country's  stage  of  supervisory  technology:  methods  of information
development.  Regulatory  strategies  that make sense  for  collection  and management,  legal processes  for prompt
industrial  c untries are unlikely  to work  the same  way in  and equitable  default  resolution,  and .nechanisms  for
developing  countries.  controlling  the incentive  conflicts  that lead bankers  and
Kane  examines  opportunities  for transferring  the  government  supervisors  to resist the healthy exit or
framework  of risk-based  capital requirements  negotiated  recapitalization  of damaged  institutions.
by the G-10  countries  under the auspices  of the Bank  for  As  a first step,  Kane recoinmends  that the World Bank
International  Settlemerts  in Basle.  He finds  that an  and the Bank  for International  Settlements  promote
unchanged  transfer  cf the Basle  framework  to developing  economically  beneficial  reforms in information  collection
countries is economically  inappropriate  and politically  and management,  reforms  that do not preclude  flexibility
infeasible.  And its voluntary  adaptation  is difficult  in current prudential  standards  in individual  countries.
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DIFFICULTIES  OF TRANSFERRING  RISK-BASED CAPITAL
REQUIREMENTS  TO  DEVELOPING  COUNTRIES
Edward J. Kane
,BsonColl
In principle, financial regulation seeks to remedy recognized deficiencies and
inefficiencies in a nation's economic, political, and bureaucratic incentive structures.
Because the social urgency of particular financial policy problems differs according to a
country's state of development, regulatory strategies that make sense for developed
countries are unlikely to work in the same ways in various different developing-country
contexts.
Keeping this idea in the fo-efront, this paper cxarnines opportunities for
transferring the framework of risk-based capital requirements that was negotiated by the
G-10 countries under the auspices of the Bank for International Settlements in Basle.  The
analysis finds that an unadapted transfer of the Basie framework is economically
inappropriatEc  and politically infeasible.  At the same time, voluntary adaptation is
difficult because the long-run economic appropriateness and short-run political
embracability of hypothetical adaptations in the Basle framework of solvency regulation
stand in direct opposition to each other.
The author believes that the elements of supervisory technology that most
desperately need to be transferred to developing countries are methods of information
collection and management, legal processes for prompt and equitable default resolution,
and mechanisms for controlling the incentive conflicts that lead bankers and government
supervisors to resist the healthy exit or recapitalization of damaged institutions.  As a first
step, the paper recommends that the World Bank and Bank for International Settlements
(BIS) promote economically beneficial reforns  in information collection and
management that do not in themselves preclude flexibility in the prudential standards that
hold sway in individual countries.
* The  author  is the  James  F.  Cleary  Professor  in Finance  at Boston  College.  He  wishes  to thank  the  World
Bank  for  financial  support  and  Herb  Baer,  Gerald  Caprio,  Asli Demirgu.-Kunt,  Robert  Ecenbeis,  David
Scou.  Andrew  Sheng,  Joseph  F. Sinkey.  Jr.,  and Dimitri Vitias for valuable  comments  on an earlier  draft2
L. Problems of Adapting the 0.10 Pattern of Solven=y
Regulation to Developing Countries
For G-10 countnies,  the 1988 Basle agreement served two purposes: prescribing
limits  on beggar-thy-neighbor  opponunities for slackening  bank supervision  as a means
of promoting  the export  of financial  services to other  countries  and improving  the
efficiency  of prudential  bank  regulation on a global basis. Obviously,  promoting
financial-services  exports is a relevant issue only for countries  whose  institutions  compete
credibly  for foreign  customers  in the global financial  marketplace.
The G-10  agreement  symbolizes  the ostensible  disdain  that authorities  in the
financially  most-developed  nations of the world have  for policies  that seek to use lax
banking  regulation  as a device for winning financial  trade rrom  other countries.
However,  in developing  countries,  lax prudential banking  regulation  serves  other sectors
and much broader  policy  purposes (Eisenbeis, 1992). These  other  interests  must be
identified  anid  addressed  on a country-by-country  basis  if leaders  of these  countries  are to
be expected  to accept  outside  restraint on their ability to use bank solvency  policy to
con;rol the amount  or distribution  of credit.
As a scheme  for increasing  global regulatory  efficiency,  the Basle  agreement
embodies  two  thrusts. It erects a shared rule-based  framework  for currently  measuring
and enforcing  individual-bank  solvency and it pledges  signatory  governments  to .t.  ong-
run evolutionary  task  of improving  their bank solvency  standards.
The current  frarnework  prescribes that calculations  of bank iisk exposure
recognize  the effect  of various  off-balance-sheet  positions  and requi.es  that risk weights
be developed  to categorize  differences  in estimated  credit  risk across  broad  asset
categories. Evolutionary  goals envisioned  for the system  include  the incorporation  of
other types  of risk, particularly  interest-rate  and sectoral  credit-concentration  risk.
Currently,  the Basle  framework  sets minimum  ratios for stockholder  equity  and
total capital,  respectively,  at four and eight percent of a bank's  risk-weighted  credit-risk
exposure. But the pact's  exclusive focus on credit risk  and purportedly  common
standards  for measuring  bank capital allow considerable  leeway  for individual  countries
in how  risk,  capital,  and supervisory  standards may  be interpreted  and implemented  (Hall,
1'A90).  Although  a source  of current regulatory  enfeeblement,  these  implementational
loopholes  are envisioned  as agreement-promoting  sweeteners  meant  to ease the transition3
for individual  G-10  countries  to common  and comprehensive  rules and then  fade away
over time.
Trying  to adapt the Basle framework  and pledge  to the service  of developing
countries  poses  a hard dilemma. On the one hand, to establish  commensurate  levels of
safety  between  banks  in G-10 and developing  countries,  minimum  ratios for bank capital
would  realistically  have  to be tied to inverse  measures  of the completeness  of a country's
financial  infrastructure  and the perceived  s.ability of its financial,  macroeconomic,  and
political  environments.  On the other hand, to wvin  the acceptance  of leaders  of developing
countries,  the risk-based  framework  and evolutionary  pledge  would  have to offer
considerable  flexibility.  In particular,  authorities  in most  of these  countries  would  want
to preserve  their  discretion  to relax effective  capital standards  when  their economies  or
banks became  weak.
The political  ,.nvironments  of most developing  countries  subordinate  bank
supervision  to monetary-policy  goals. Leaders typically  piefer to be able to relax
supervisory  priorities  as necessary  to serve these larger goals. This preference  assigns a
low value  to year-to-year  continuity  in bank supervision. Any shoit-run  threat  to a
government's  survival,  whether  from scandal ot adverse  macroeconomic  events, is apt to
persuade  its leaders  to de-emphasize  long-run  plans  for improving  bank supervision.
While  policy  instability  probably narrows with  financial  development,  it
represents  a universal  feature of modem nation states. Even in developed  countries,
authorities  prove  all too comfortable  with imposing  delayed  but  long-lasting  costs on
strong  banks  and general  taxpayers  to generate  quick-developing  but transient  benefits for
targeted  sectors. Administrative  discretion to downgrade  the importance  of prudential
supervision  and  i.  nstall  ad hoc systems for influencing  the sectoral  allocation  of
deposit-institution  credit  has been  repeatedly  exercised  in the U.S. One need  look no
farther  than  the Clinton  Administration's  protriotion  of "community  development  banks"
and its efforts  to respond  stubborn  macroeconomic  weaknesses  by taking  steps to help
smaU  business  to deal  with the politically  convenient  scapegoat  of a bank-led  "credit
crunch."
It is hard to imagine  how the international  communir)  could  exercise  enough
discipline  to make  it likely  that long-term financial-regulation  commitments  made by
fading  or discredited  governments  would  be upheld  in the face  of strong  political4
counterincentives.  Acknowledging  the inescapability  of systematic  political  overrides,
this paper  does not try to establish  how  the level and structure  of bank capital
requirements  should vary ideally  across  nations  with different financial  and
macroeconomic  milieus. Rather,  the paper seeks to clarify the urgency  of reshaping  the
informational  infrastructure  of financial  institutions  in developing  countries  so as to
improve  and standardize  the methods  used to measure  capital and risk exposure  at
commercial  banks.
The analysis  presumes  that the difficulty  of monitoring  and pclicing  bank
solvency  and enforcing  a rational  exit  policy increases  as a nation's  financial
infrastructure  becomes  more  rudimentary  and/or more nationalized  (Polizatto,  1990;
Scott, 1992). In developing  and former  Socialist  countries, the wonh of individual  assets
and liabilities  cannot be tracked  with gr -at precision. Poor information  systems,
extensive  govemment  ownership,  thin finanzial  markets,  and shortages  of supervisory
skills  make banks especially  hard to value Information  gaps and the concentrations  in
export earnings  expose stakeholders  in developing-country  banks to difficult-to-hedge
adverse  economic  shocks. At the same  time, the rggulatory  and supervisory  skills  needed
to monitor and police bank risk taking  are hard for these countries to develop  and  retain.
These difficulties  limit  how  much the world regulatory  community  can reasonably
expect  risk-based  capital  requirements  to achieve in developing  countries. They  create  e
need  to constrain  --rather than  piously  striving  to eliminate-- variation  across  countries  in
how to measure  risk and  capital and in how to deal with weakness  in bank capital  when  it
arises. As a first step, the World Bank  and BIS can reasonably  exert such  constraint  by
designing  ard promotirg the transfer  of prototype information  systems  for bank  record-
keeping and  credit analysis. Its staff  must expressly  adapt and stratify  different
information  systems for differentiated  supervisory  use in countries  whose  financial
markets  and institutions  qualify  as logically  distinct financial  environments.
Recognizing  that policy  frameworks  will never completely  converge  highlights
the advantages  of assuring  that, within  limits that are set inescapably  by observational
difficulty,  bank risk-taking  and capital  positions  are transparent  enough  in all countries  to
be monitored  and disciplined  by stockholders,  customers,  regulators,  ard taxpayers.
Implicitly  or explicitly,  the organization  of bank supervision  in any country  may  be
divided  into two parts. First, regulators  establish  incentives  that seek to encourage  banks5
to hold sufficient  capital  to support  their overall 'oss exposure. Second,  the suppliers
(i.e., owners)  of whatever  mix of private  and governmental  capital  each bank  actually
deploys  look for informadon  with which to monitor the loss exposure  their stake  in the
bank passes through  to them. In developed  and developing  countries  alike,  the great
('anger is that taxpayer  stakes  in explicitly  and implicitly  nationalized  banks  remain  at
least partly hidden  from view. Defects  in the incentive  systems  governing  public  service
are supported  by blockages  in the flcw of information  on the quality  of job performance.
In any country  where  the private monitoring  sector of the financial  infrastructure  is weak
or nonexistent,  regulatory  performance  can be improved  by an inflow  of skilled  resources
into independent  prvate auditing  and credit-rating  industrics.
The fact of countercyclical  and idiosyncratic  fluctuationm  in a society's  political
willingness  to enforce  restrictions  on the deal-making  opportunities  of its banks  calls for
lawyers,  accountants,  and economists  to develop information,  contracting,  and regulatory
technologies  that  can permit  capital stndards to be tightened  or relaxed  over the business
cycle in an economically  efficient  manner. In practice,  supcrvisory  efforts  often  offset
rather than  reLninorce  the market  pressures  that would ordinarily  discipline  the risks to
which bank  lending,  funding,  and other ;)usiness  strategies  expose  various  stakeholders.
Brock  concludes  from surveying  banking policy in Latin American  countries  (1992,  p.
xiii) that "government  shielding  of banks from the hazards  ... and influence  of thL  free
market  fosters  unsound,  crisis-prone  banking systems."
Government  supervisory  mechanisms  that are intended  to assure  prompt
corrective  action  from  economically  insolvent  banks cannot  be stopped  from  responding
to pol-1cal  and  macroeconomic  pressure. Nevertheless,  economic  efficiency  would  be
served if governments  would  commit  to fostering unbiased and  nonsecretive
measurement  of private  and governmental  contributions  to bank  capital. If
infornationally  disadvantaged  bank stakeholders  are to be protected  throughc'tt  the
globe, individual  country  banks must be monitored  and disciplined  by reliable  parties
who  can make  it difficult  for politicians  and regulators to renege  surreptitiously  on their
commitment  to informational  adequacy  and transparency.6
1, M  -- ,nk  Capital
Repetidon  of regulatory-policy  jargon tends to anesthetize  observers  to the need to
explore nuances  in the meaning  of the economic concepts  that stand  at the heart  of policy
discussions. Each  of the four v ords featured in the term "risk-based  capital
requirements"  is conceptually  much less straightforward  than it appears  at first blush.
Everyone  agrees  that a t .nk's  cil  position is a measure  of net worth:  the value
of its assets net of appropriate  iabilities. However, great differences  exist both  about
huw individual  assets  and liabilities  should be valued and about  which  of a bank's
individual  positions  and  commitments  should be itemized  and netted  against  each othcr.
Similarly,  everyone  agrees that ti£k  refers to the chance  that  a bank  may  encoulnter
bad future oatcomes.  Good  and bad outcomes emerge as the net effect  of variation  in
customer  loan  default  experience,  in bank liquidity needs,  in relative  interest  rates, in
employee  fraud,  in operative  regulatory  and tax frameworks,  in the price  of foreign
exchange,  and in other  systemic  forces. Finan:ial  nalysts  frequently  aisagree  about
whether  the  chanck  of some  bad outcomes  is either adequately  hedged  or small  enough to
be neglected. Moreover,  what is bdd  or good may vary with the horizon  over which  a
bank's performance  is to be evaluated. Even ex ante, investments  that  look wonderful  in
the short run may  look  disadvantageous  in the long run, and vice  versa.
in addition,  framing  the policy  task as if it were one of developing  a set  of
reasonable  capital  rirats  adopts  a dangerous simplification.  Promulgating  a set of
supervisory  standards  is only half of the task, in that standards  do not  of themselves  bind
regulatee behavior. Supplementary  action must be taken to motivate  regulators  to
implement  --and banks  to  meet-- the balance-sheet  targets  promulgated  standards
embody. In practice,  only  enforcement  procedurms  can fulfill  this  additional  function.
Adequate  penalties  must  be defined and these penalties must be promptly  and predictably
enforced.
Finally,  the operative  policy  question is not whether  it is prudent  for supervisors
to ba  bank capital  standards  on risk. nie  desirability  of this  connection  goes  without
saying. The problem  lies in firding a risk-weighting formula  that  covers  all relevant
types of risk and balances  the costs and benefits the policy  generates  for regulatees.
Conscientious  policymakers  must recognize that, to balance  benefits  and costs  through
time, the risk-weighting  framework  must be adaptive  enough to respond  to change  in7
expectations  and to evolve  with financial  technology  and the larger  economic
environment.
Bank  Canital as a Financial Stake Being Plaged at Risk by Less-Prntected Parties
Modem  corporate  finance views a frum  as an aggregate  of explicit  and implicit
contracts  that  collectively  assign various  claimants a prospective  "stake"  in the  cash flows
a firm's  assets generate Although  individual stakes can be positive  or regative, the
market value  of all stakes  must sum to the market value of the assets. A bank's  principal
stakeholders  include:  stockholders;  mranagers  anrd  other  emplyces;  established  borTowcrs;
depositors;  nouideposit  creditors;  and (through the explicit or implicit  government
guarantees  other stakeholders  may  enjoy) taxpayers.
The value  of each stakeholder's  claim may be cor.ceived  as the present  discoun:ed
value of the returns  that  claimholder  may reasorably project will develop  in the future.
Stakeholders  command  risk premiums  for whatever  risks the market  perceives  to inhere
in their positions. Hence,  the riskier its projected  cash flows, the more severe  the
discount  rate to which  a stakeholder's  anticipated  returns are subject.
To asscss  a claim's  riskiness,  it is instructive  to array bank stakeholders  in two
related  ways: (1) in terms  of their ability to force liquidation  and the priority  or
"seniority"  their  claims  receive  in the event the bank is liquieated,  or (2) in terms  of
stakeholders'  access  to "inside"  (i.e.,  nonpublic)  information  about the bank's  futi're
prospects. Accountants,  economists,  regulators, and financial  analysts  all interpret  a
bank's  "capital"  to measure  the D= assets that a designated  group  cf potentially  junior or
inside stakeholders  stand  to lose before future losses begin to reach senior  or outside
stakeholders.
Bank  capital  is meant  to act as a "shock absorber"  for claimholders  whose  stakes
are positioned  up the line in a loss-absorption  chair.  of financial  dominoes.  Writing  the
funding  contracts  that determine  where stakeholdcrs  stand  in this  chain  can be likened to
spacing  these  dominoes. The first few dominoes  in the array am typically  placed  close
together. These  dominoes  are apt to wobble whenever  the value  of bank earnings  or
assets is bumped  unfavorably.  On the other hand, the last few  dominoes  stand  fairly far
apart. They are likely  to be jarred only by shocks that are truly  severe.
In the simplest  funding  structure,  bank capital consists  of the value  of every  dollar
(or other currency  unit)  of owner  equity  that stands in front of depositor  claims. Whether8
they face  simple  or complicated  funding structures,  depositors  and  their guarantors  need
to defend  their  hoped-for  isolation from piobable loss. This is done  efficiently  --not by
setting  high  initial  capital  requirerments--  but by making  sure  that the stakes  of lower-
priority  svakeholders  are rebuilt promptly  whenever  they  decline  in value. This means
monitoring  the value  of lesser-priority  stakes and pressuring  bank managements  emther  to
rebuild  or to sunender thesc  posido-s when and as advcrse  developments  compromise
them.
Measuring  the sensitivity  of insider stakes  to the asset and liability  writedowns
that might  be implied  by changing conditions  ';  the operational  problem  that bank
supervisors  face  under  the risk-based  capital framework. To address  this problem,
;upervisors  -nust  promote  adequacy and transparency  in bank record  keeping.
For credit  policy and loan evaluation,  this means  installing  documentation
requirements  that  mandate  establishing  adequate provisions  for loai.  losses and explicit
files for each  of the traditional  five C's of credit analysis:  cash-flow  projections,
collateral,  char;.;ter  evaluation,  vulnerability  to changing  economic  conditions,  and
borrower  capital  strength.
Explicit  and implicit  government  guarantees  of borrower  performance  are
collateral-like  "credit  enhancements." Especially  in developing  countries,  it is important
to separate  the value of formal  and conjectural  guarantees  a bank  receives  from the stand-
alone  value  of loans  it makes to state-owned  enterprises  and members  of governmentally
favored  economic  sectors.
In any developing  country, improving  the quality  of bank information  systems
needs  to be made  a high-ranking  objectivc  of prudential  regulation.  In more than a few
countries,  loan-loss  provisioning  has been ignored and  several  of the hypothetical  "five
C" file folders  that  constitute  appropriate  credit files  have  been left emptv. In these
countries,  setting  a nominai  10-percent  or 20-percent  capital  requirement  will do less to
stabilize  the banlking  sector than adopting  a conscientious  program  for building  databases
-at  individual  banks  that ame  capable of enhancing  capital  mea%urement  and enforcement
over time. However  defici-nt a developing  nation's ballpoint-pen  and carbo.n-paper
information  system  may  be ,t the start, its authorities  should  be urged  to throw off
limitations  on their capacity  for measurrng  bank capital  and risk  exposure  and to ensure9
that their information  base and valuation  technology  improve  over time at a reasonable
speed.
MDrfculties  sjf  RegCgnizing  and  Meaur'ing  the Government's  Contribution  tg MUi
Capital in Developiny  Countries
Even in G-10  countries,  depositors  enjoy implicit  and explicit  government
gualantees  of repayment. Typically,  the user charges that banks  pay for these  credit
enhance,nents  fail to capture  the full value of -it  least the implicit  or conjectural  ponion of
the guarantees  they  enjoy.
Economic  analysis  conceives  of the capitalized  va  e of underpriced  government
guarantees  as a taxpayer  contribution  to bvnk capital (Kane, 1985). For banks  in
developing  countries,  the ratio  of government  capital  to private  capial often  equals  or
approaches  100  percen'. Sometimes  (as in Eastern.  Europe)  bank nadonalizadon  comes
about as a matter  of ideology. In other cases, it develops  informally  as formerly  priv4e
instituions are left open after they have  become economically  insolvent  on a stand-alone
basis. The ability  of institutions  that la^k enterprise-cor.tibuted  net worth  to service  their
depositors  comes  from a widespread  understanding  that the government  has spread  a
"safety net" that  puts taxpayers'  credit  in place of funds provided  by the bank's  nominal
owners.
Managerial  and  regulatory  incentives  differ greatly  between  private  and
governmer.  owned  banks. Whether  a country's banks are nationalized  de iur  or merely
d: facto, the condition  of effective  government  ownership  lessens  the prudential  benefits
society  receives  from risk-based  capital  requirements. This occurs  for two reasons. First,
with respect  to risk-taking  the interests  of top govemment  rmgulators  and the least-secured
private  stakeholders  in a gov:rnment  bank tend to converge  rather than  diverge. Second,
taxpayers  are seldom  able to monitor  the use made of their stake  in a bank  as effecively
as private  stockholders  and bondholders  can.
Whether  and how  well  risk-based  capital  requirements  nelp  taxpayers  to mor.i!^r
their stake  in a country's  banks depends  on how well and 1lOw  frequently  the information
system  measures  taxpayer  stakes  and bank risk taking  for them. Hence,  for govemment-
owned  and  private  banks alike,  weaknesses  in information  and valuation  technologies
stand  as major  obstacles  to better  prudential  regulation.10
Itemizat;on  Issues
An asset is .nything  that  produces  prospective  positive  cash flows  and a liability
is any claim that serves to fund the value  of one's asset holdings. A corporation's  balance
sheet  records its assets as positive  items and enters liabilities  with a negative  sign.
Economic  concepts  of bank capital  look to capturc the capitalized  value  of AU
sources  and uses of funds. In effect,  economists  present  net worth as an estimate  of the
stock-market  value of owning  the firTrn.
In the U.S., the capital  concept  embodied  in accountants'  Generally  Accepted
Accounting  Principles  (GAAP)  employs  a more-selective  itemization  scheme. Except
when  they are asked to account  for the price one corporation  pays to purchase  control  of
another,  accountants  itemize only what they call "tangible"  items.
A tangible  asset is something  that can in principle be bought  and sold separately
from the particular  enterprise  which  happens  to employ it at the moment. An  intangible
asset is an asset that has value  only when it is deployed  in combination  with other
tangible  assets (as, e.g., the loyaltv  of a firm's customer  base) or is a right conferred  on
the owner by a government  (as, e.g., a patent)  or other corporation  (as,  e.g., a leaschold  or
patent  license). Intangible  assets include  "going-concern  values"  that allow  the collection
of intangible  assets that a firm  manages  to earn a higher  return in a given  enterprise  than
these  assets could earn if they  were redeployed  to their next-best  use.
Elements  of the accounting  concept  of intangible  "goodwill"  may  be recorded  in
footnotes  in the U.S., but goodwill  may  only be booked into a firm's balance  sheet  when
it is necessary  to account  for a firm's  purchase  price. Goodwill is a resieual  accounting
item that serves  to reconcile  the GAAP  concept  of net worth on the date of a corporate
acquisition  or merger with the economic  concept  of the market value (i.e.,  the purchase
price) of the corporation. In purchase  accounting,  GAAP net worth has two  components.
The first component  consists  of the liquidation  value of the net tangible  assets  of the
target  firm. Goodwill  is conceived  as the additional  value the fLrm  is able to promise  as a
going  concern. In turn, a firm's going-concern  value is presumed  to come from  having
accumulated  a skilled  staff and favorable  reputation  and having  deployed  the firn's assets
in products  and locations  that are mutually  adapted  to the wants of a loyal customer  base.
Accounting  goodwill  measurcs  intangible  net worth. It represents  the  capitalized
value of putative sources of valuc that GAAP ordinarily neglects.  Goodwill values theII
firm's ability  to earn above-market  returns  on the tangible  positions  shown  in its tangible
balance  sheet. In principle,  financial  economists  seek to partition  a corporation's
intangible  net worth  into three  time-related  portions:
a) the value  of "identifiable"  intangible  assets such as a corporate  reputation,  staff,
business  locations,  and a customer base whose value  is built  up from wise
expenditures  made in the ps;
b) the capitalized  value of ongoina.  net regulatory  subsidies  or burdens  that flow
from  existing  and projected  laws and supervisory  practices;
c) the present  value  of growth  opportunities  (PVGO),  which  varies  according  to
strategic  adaptations  and innovations that the corporation  might  make in
the fu.
Stock  market  values  or takeover  bids that diverge greatly  from book  values  of
tangible  net worth  make  U.S. regulators  uncomfortable. However,  when  U.S. regulators
choose to give  accounting  relief  to troubled institutions,  they  typically  do so by
selectively  authorizing  these  institutions  to record the values of specific  categories  of
intangible  assets. For  example,  in 1982  federal regulators authorized  beleaguered  thrift
institutions  to take  into their  balance  sheets appraisal-based  estimates  of the extent  to
which  theL office buildings  had appreciated  above their book  value.
A skeptical  attitude  toward  intangible  net worth is embodied  in the itemization
rules established  by the Basle  agreement. To the extent that intangible  sources  of net
worth are recognized,  such  items are classified as "secondary"  rather than  "primary"
capital.
Downplaying  intangible  net worth is traditional  among  Western  European
regulators,  who have  long preferred  that their banks maintain  off-balance-sheet  sources  of
strength. But it is doubtful  that East European  and deve'oping  countries  can afford  to
neglect  intangible  items. The desirability  of assuring that intangible  positions  are valued
fairly around  the world  should  lead the World Bank to conduct  research  aimed  at
identifying  reliable  procedures  for valuing  intangible bank assets in different  financial
environments.
Valuzalodn s
In different  countries,  professional  accounting  standards  boards  are free to
authorize  different  valuation  principles. For U.S. deposit  institutions,  GAAP  bal.,nce12
sheets develop item values from their historical  =.  Items  are carried at historical cost
except in two cases: (1) when it is decided to reserve  against a "reasonably  anticipated"
loss and (2) when an amonization account is established  to reduce an item's book value
according to a specified  schedule  of decline (e.g., to reflect depreciation).
Economists  seek  to measure  an asset's cent  xn=  and liken  attempts  to rely on
historical-cost  measures  of bank perforTnance  to trying to steer a car by monitoring  the
car's progress  through  its rearview  mirror. To economists, an asset's  value  comes  not
from what was once  paid  to acquire  it, but from its present-day  ability  to generate  future
income.
Current  values  may  either  be observed or estimated. Current  value  is treated  as
indirectly  observable  whenever  the price of identical or closely comparable  substitute
assets trade in active  public  markets. However, when comparability  to traded  assets is
imperfect  or the observability  of some  dimensions of the price paid  is impaired,
appraisers  and economists  need  to check market-based  judgments  against  calculations  of
the  present  discounted  value  (PDV)  of reasonable projections  of the asset's  future  returns.
In principle,  the interest  rate  employed  in the discounting  process  increases  both with the
variability  of the asset's  objective  retums and with the shakiness  of the subjective
assumptions  on which  projections  must be founded. In practice,  conscientious  analysts
experiment  with a range  of altemative  retum projections and discount  rates  with the aim
of developing  high and  low  estimates  that may be confidently  said to bracket  an asset's
true PDV. Because  the  process  of making and discounting  projections  leaves  potential
room for dishonestly  manipulating  hypothetical item values,  economists  regard  adjusted
market values as a more  pmcise  and  reliable touchstone than  PDV.
Constraining  Regulator  Arbitrariness
Although  constrained  to some  extent  by international  agreements,  financial
regulators in different  countries  and different regulatory  agencies  are free  to adopt
whatever  itemization  rules and blend  of historical-cost and current-value  approaches
happens to serve  their  immediate  policy  purposes. The World Bank  or BIS  can make
these policy choices  less inefficient  by forging and promulgating  market-disciplined
standards  for capital  measurement  and risk assessment. The procedures  outlined  in the
following  sections  ame  reproducible,  model-based,  and designed  both to confront  and to
lessen the data limitations  that  are known  to exist in developing  countries.13
If promulgated  for universal  use, these procedures  need  not themselves  place a
country's  policymakers  at an impossible  disadvantage. This is because  the disciplinary
use to be made of the resulting  measures  would still be left to the discretion  of local
policymakers.  Whether  authorities  in a given country  want to enforce  high or low ratios
of risk-adjusted  capital,  taxpayers  are bound to be exploited  if regulators  are prevented
from challenging  weak  banks'  efforts to overstate their capital  strength  and understate
their risks.
1_1I  Confronting the Need  for Better7r_orTatoon SysteMS  for Measuring Bank Risk
Banks  are institutions  that earn income by servicing  the rinancial  wants of their
customer  base. Among  customer  wants is a desire to transfer  risk from themselves
financial-services  firms. This want is important  enough that a major  portion  of tht t el
income earned  by most banks consists of rewards they  accrue  in exchange  for relic'  ..
their  customers  of "calculated"  risks. A bank's ability to earn profits  from risk-takin&
turns on its managers  being  able to understand the risks that attach  to the deals they
accept and to extract  a rmasonable  return for bearing  these  risks.
It is either  unrealistic  or a sign of poor management  for bankers  to argue that the
opportunity-cost  value  of their institution's  capital is essentially  unknowable.  Whether  a
bank is evaluating  an existing  position or a new lending  or funding  opportunity,  its
managers  must assess  and  price the associated  risk fairly. Good  management  begins  with
establish`ng  a system  that  can generate  the information  needed  to track at least the broad
magnitude  of the corporate  accounts  that is asked to control. What  differs across
countries  is how  reliably  a conscientious  inside or outside  analyst  may  estimate  the
distance  between  upper  and lower bounds  on reasonable  estimates  of the value  of bank
capital (Berger,  King,  and  O'Brien, 1991).
In developing  sociedes,  economic  information  and analysis  are scarcer  than  they
are in developed  countries.  Tnis scarcity increases  the expense  of generating  upper,
lower,  and baseline  projections  of most would-be  borrowers'  economic  prospects  and
decreases  the reliability  of whatever  projections  are made. Differences  in the costs of
compiling  and  analyzing  relevant information  help to explain why  corporate  reliance  on
ownership  equity  and  use of financial  intermediaries  tends  to be high in infornation-poor14
economies, while information-rich societies experience expanding use of patterns of
direct finance (Mayer, 1993; DemirgUg-Kunt and Huizenga, 1993).
While acknowledging that dramatic growth has occurred in the ways that a
modern bank can expose itself to risk, Corrigan (1992) opines that: ..."almost without
exception, the most serious banking problems encountered in recent years have grown out
of old-fashioned difficulties with bad loans and excessive concentrations." (pp. 5-6)
Except that it has yet to deal with concentration  and governmental default risk, the Basle
Agreement is based on this presumption.  It seeks to align a bank's capital with its
exposure to nongovernmental credit risk.  A unit risk weight is assigned to the loans a
bank makes to businesses and consumers.  "Credit conversion factors" are employed to
translate off-balance-sheet positions (e.g., debt guarantees and forward commitments)
into loan-equivalent  investments.  In fashioning both the conversion factors and the
weights assigned other on-balance-sheet assets, the unit weight assigned to bank loans
serves as the linchpin of the risk-evaluation  system.  Fractional weights or conversion
factors of zero, twenty, or fifty percent are assigned to other portfolio pcsitions.  Because
this approach ignores potentially important variation within each risk class, each factor
and weight is best conceived as expressing the extent to which the particular activity
suffers on average from default risk.
Default  risk is the danger that the money a bank loans out will not be returned
with interest as promised. For private and governmental borrowers alike, payment
schedules must be established so that borrower performance can be tracked explicitly.
Categories of nonperformance for loan contracts range from delays that leave payments
in arrears through payments that prove late enough to be classified as formally delinquent
to events of de facto default.  It is not wise to permit payments to be booked routinely
from prepaid interest reserves or open credit lines. This obscures information that in any
well-managed bank could play an important role in designating loans for inclusion on its
early warning watchlist. Any delay in the flow of promised payments entails opportunity
losses for a bank and raises the possibility that the borrower is in fact taking a first step on
the road to a partial or complete default.
In the U.S., privately supplied software for analyzing bank loans and other kinds
of counterparty  risk is an important managerial innovation whose applications are
expanding and whose use in consumer, mortgage, and even commercial lending use isspreading  rapidly. Treating  Corrigan's  assertion about "banking  problems"  as a scientific
hypothesis  about  bank risk that is applicable  to developing  countries  implies  that initial
efforts to transfer  risk-based  capital standards  to developing  countries  ought  to
concentrate  on using existing  U.S. credit-analysis  and database  software  as a paradigm
for improving  the information  and credit-analysis  systems  used in developing  economies.
Credit-Apglication EIles  As a Datahase
TO  qualify  for a bank loan,  every would-be  borrower  must provide  enough
information  on its affairs and prospects  to convince the bank that  it is prudent  to advance
the funds  requested. Bank  credit analysis  turns on an assessmcnt  of the traditional  "five
Cs" of creditworthiness:  character,  capacity  (or cash flow),  capital, collateral,  and
conditional  economic  invulnerability  (Sinkey, 1992, p. 515). Any bank's  loan  application
formn  can be regarded  as a questionnaire  that seeks to extract  infornation on these
attributes. Analysis  of this information  by bank credit experts  looks to assign  a risk-
rating to the various  deals that customers  offer.
"Character"  is a subjective  variable  that summarizes  a borrower's  reputation  for
probity  and fair play. Lenders  prefer to deal with honorable  parties  who are detemined
to live up to their  obligations  if they  possibly can. Bank files  on character  begin  with the
information  that  each applicant  supplies  on its credit  history. Borrower  honesty  is
assessed  by testing  this infornation against  credit-bureau  and other  data-service  files and
by cross-checking  other falsifiable  facts  with suppliers,  customers,  and other lenders.
Additional  evidence  is sometimes  collected  by asking around about  the fuim's  reputation
in the communities  and markets  in which  it operates.
Double-checking  applicant-supplied  information  is an important  test of character.
This is why it would be useful  for the World Bank  or BIS to help  developing  countries
establish  or strengthen  the presence  or competence  of private credit  bureaus  and  credit
rating agencies. Because  government  as well as private  debt needs  to be rated in these
countries,  it would  also be beneficial  to seek ways to insulate  the work  of credit-
infornation agencies  from political  influence.
The other  four "Cs" focus on the borrower's  ability to pay. They  seek to clarify
how  funds to repay the loan  can be generated. Data  for analyzing  a business  firn's
capacity  and potental vulnerability  to changes  in economic  conditions  ame  collected  in the
form  of business  plans and from  questions that focus on management  skills  and16
experience. This part of the loan file describes  the company's  markets,  customers,
suppliers,  competitors,  and depth of management.  The purpose of collecting  this
information  is to establish  whether  the borrower  can use the loan proceeds  productively.
The database  includes the firm's  past income  statements  and tax returns. It also  should
contain the firm's  formal projections  of cash flow, earnings, interest,  and taxes.
Capital  measures  the value of resources  from which a borrower  might  still  repay
the loan  even if the project  being financed  works out poorly. A borrower's  capital  is
measured  in the same  way as a bank's  own  capital. Data for calculating  capital  come
from business  balance sheets  and supplementary  data on value of relevant  intangible
assets.
Collateral  represents  supplementary  ways to enhance a borrower's  credit  so as to
qualify  the loan  for a more favorable  interest  rate. Lenders  look for outside  guarantors
and for assets whose title can be pledged  to the lender  to curtail the banks'  , xposure  to
loss if the borrower  should  fail to deliver  the stream  of repayments  promised.
EXoert Sstems  for Credit AnaIl
The object of credit analysis  is to determine  the odds that a particular  loan  will go
bad. The information-processing  activity  of seasoned  credit professionals  or "experts"
can be likened  to an artificial  intelligence  system (Singleton  and Surkan, 1991).
Expert systems  for credit  analysis  seek to objectify  and automate  routine  parts of
the process  of assigning  and aggregating  bond-issuer  or customer  scores  for the five Cs of
creditworthiness.  The goal  is to approximate  the probability-formation  process  that
experts  go through  in trying to assess  the financial  condition  and stability  of potential
borrowers. This means positing  n proxy  variables  that can be interpreted  as theoretically
relevant credit attibutes  (Aj, j=1, ..., n) and incorporating these variables into a statistical
model  of the probability  of default for a given loan to the kth borrower,  Pk. The various
attributcs  that  characterize  a given borrower  (say, the kth customer)  come from  reported
facts and estimated  economic  exposures.
The specific  value the jth attribute  takes on for bank borrower  k can be denoted  by
Ajk. The Aj include economic,  financial  and personal  variables:  loan  terms;  borrower
characterstics;  applicable  economic  conditions;  and legal constraints  the bank may  face
(e.g..  on their  ability to foreclose  against  loan collateral).17
Specific  attributes  that are widely  used in mortgage lending  include:  the loan-to-
value ratio; the borrower's  delinquency  record; the borrower's  occupation;  the number  of
dependents  in the borrower's  family;  and the ratio of the mortgage  payments  to family
income. In the U.S. the Equal  Credit  Opportunity  Act prevents  many  personal  attributes
from being  ltgally used in such  models. In particular, neither gender,  national  origin,
race, religion,  marital  status,  nor receipt  of public assistance may  be used  in credit
decisions.
Specific  attributes  useful  in scoring business loans or corporate  bonds  include
industry  and macroeconomic  trends and income and balance-sheet  information  such as
leverage,  interest  coverage,  return  on equity, and earnings volatility. Zeller  (1993)
discusses  opponunities  for linkihig  business  credit-scoring  models  to larger  models  of
macroeconomic  and industrial  ac.tv'Acy.
In practice,  to prevent  estimated  default probabilities  from  rising  above  unity or
falling  below one, credit  scoring  models  must be nonlinear. However,  the following
linear  form provides  a convenient  way to illustrate  these models'  logical  flow:
n
Pk - ao +  2j Ajk + ukj.
j=1
Using this model,  the  coefficients  aj may be interpreted  as marginal  risk  coming
from attribute  j and the value  Pk provides  a direct measure of the per-dollar  risk weight
the bank's  capital  would  face in making  the loan. The focus of credit  scoring  is to predict
statistically  the likelihood  that specific  customers  will prove "slow-paying,"  "delinquent,"
or "pass into formal  default." In the finance literature, statistical  research  has been used
to derive and validate  the attributes  included in models for different  types  of loans  (e.g.,
Altman,  cLaL 1981;  Boyes,  Hoffman,  and Low, 1989;  Chesser,  1974;  and  Chhikara,
1989).
To adapt one or more  of the models validated in this literature  to the context  of an
individual  bank and  country,  countries  may be divided into three broad  classes. Analysts
must begin by ascertaining  whether  loan officers routinely collect  infornation  on the
attributes  featured  in one or more  of the previously validated  models. In countries  where
necessary  data are not yet collected  at the bank level, a useful  reform  would  be to impose
a better  information  system  on domestic  banks. For countries  that  currently  satisfy  or18
come to meet data-availability  requirements  for one or more models,  parameters  can be
estimated and tested for reliability  by using a sample of loan applications  that  have  been
screened  and approved  at designated  banks by their own loan  officers. Finally,  in
countries and banks for which  statistical  analysis can approve  at least  one model  for
transfer to their competitive  environment,  significant differences  in estimates  of marginal
risks and of the average  risks  weights  attached to different classes  of loans  can  be used by
World Bank  or BIS analysts  in cross-country  analyses of asset risks  and used  by  country
supervisors  as the basis  for empirically  based country-specific  and  bank-specific
estimates  of default  probabilities.
When and as they  are validated,  credit-scoring models provide  an empirical
method for answering  a number  of tough supervisory questions. First,  for what  classes of
assets (if any) does it make  sense  to set low or zero risk weights  in a given  country  or
class of countries? Second,  how  much safer or riskicer  on average  are a bank's  clams on a
developing  county's government  and  public enterprises than  its loans  to private
enterprises? Third, what  minimum  ratio of capital to assets may safely  be deemed
prudent for specific  developing  countries?
A scoring  model  can also  be thought of as streamlining  bank  file structures  and
even automating  the loan  decision. In this conception, computer  software  treats
infornation collected  in loan applications  as survey data and formulates  a preliminary
estimate of the bank's  optimal  loan  response. Of course, final decision  processes  must
include procedures  for varying  this  response to make use of intuitive  informnation  that
loan officers  develop  in ways  that  are not yet objecively reproducible.  In straightforward
cases, credit  evaluation  time may  be reduced to a few hours. One  U.S.  software  vendor,
Appro Systems in Louisiana,  claims  that its software can produce  a preliminary  loan
approval-or-denial  decision  in minutes.
It would  be a mistake  to dismiss  loan-analysis software  as too  sophisticated  for
use by developing  countries.  In some  developing countries, automated  teller  machines
(ATMs) and applications  of banking  software are proliferating  rapidly  (Kraus,  1992). In
fact, Fiserv  Inc. has already  contracted  with four countries in the Northem  tier  of Latin
America  (Mexico,  Honduras,  Colombia,  and Venezuela) for Spanish-language  versions
of its banking  software  (Sullivan,  1993).19
The priority  problem  lies not in designing  futuristic  software  bLt  in improving  the
quality of data  available  for model  testing and implementation.  By means  of touch-
screen  ATMvs  and cartoon  characters,  even illiterate customers  can be helped  to fill out
loan applications  electronically.  Expert systems constitute  a change  in technology  that
lessens  rather than  increases  the skill demands being placed on loan  officers  and at the
same time makes  their  job performance  and instances  of corrupt  and fraudulent  behavior
easier for supervisors  and examiners  to monitor.
Besides  tracking  changes  in risk, evidence of changing  default  probabilities  can
also be used  to set up a market-based  approach for establishing  a watchlist  and reserving
for loan  losses. Whether  used to automate  loan decisions  or merely  to monitor  them,
credit-scoring  models  can be used for timely identification  and prompt  downward  or
upward  revaluations  of problem  loans. Updated data on borrower  attributes  can be used
to track the changing  probability  of default fir  a loan has been made. While  post-loan
revaluation  is still at an early stage of development,  American  Management  Systems,  Inc.
has developed  what it calls a Strata  software system that uses scoring  models  to predict a
customer's  disposition  to pay back a delinquent  loan.
Outside Monitoring oVa  Bank'q Credit  Anal si
Credit  analysis  may be conceived  as a management  system  that  conducts
statistical  and sensitivity  analyses  of the credit-application  database. These  analyses  have
two  principal  objectives:  to calculate  applicants'  repayment  probabilities  and to value the
lending  opportunities  being  offered  to the bank. In every loan  made,  managers  should bc
able to identify  the risks in the deal and how much the bank is being  paid for bearing
these  risks. Each  contract  must be structured  to offer a risk-return  combination  that
makes  the probability  of repayment  and the loan interest  rate high enough  to promise  a
reasonable  total  profit  on the loan.
Outside  stakeholders  need  to monitor and second-guess  a bank's  risk-classification
and pricing  procedures. Bank  examination  is a process that looks to test a bank's
information  and  management  systems  for flaws. The first requirement  of effective
supervision  is access  to the data and assumptions  from which the bank calculates
repayment  probabilities  and asset values.
Even  in G-1O  countries,  supervisory  technology  falls far short of technological
possibilities.  Increasingly,  in these countries  the data and assumptions  an examiner  needs20
to evaluate will  be objectified  and "wired" into expert  systems  and intelligent
workstations  at individual  banks. As we have seen,  expert  systems  now  exist that
estimate  the risk  embodied  in individual loans. The process  of aggrega1.&g  these
estimates  into measures  of a bank's overall pofQjol risk is an exercise  in applied
portfolio  theory  that the Basle Agreement has yet to address. The resolution  of this
aggregation  problem,  when  it is addressed,  will turn on being  able  to esmate  the extent
of pairwise  correlations  between  returns on individual  loans.
Whether  or not concentration  risk is measured  formally,  it is reasonable  for
government  examiners  to develop their own standardized  expert  system  as a benchmark
for analyzing  the loan  portfolios  of individual banks. It is also  reasonable  for them to
seek to co-ordinate  and standardize  system architecture  and inforTnation  file structure
across  banks. This is true whether  or not the bank being  examined  yet uses  computer
software  to conduct  credit  analysis. In developed and  developing  countries  alike,
examiners  and top  bank managements  share an interest  in automating  bank credit files
and internal  risk analyses  at reasonable  speed.  At a minimum,  loan  deWisions  need to be
linked  specifically  to an information  file of borrower  characterisdcs  and prospects. This
file begins  with  the data would-be  borrowers furnish  in loan  applications,  but this
database  needs  to be updated  routinely as time passes  and loan  proceeds  are collected  or
delayed. As a country's  banks convert to electronic files,  monitoring  costs can be
minimized  if supervisors  insist that banks cooperate  in designing  ways  to input  their files
into "transportable"  private  credit-rating and govemment  examination  systems.
Banks  and supervisors  in G- 10 counties must make  progress  on these  problems
before authorities  in developing  countries  can be expected  to do much  about them. But
the systems  developing  countries  adopt today should  be made  ready  to incorporate
systemic  changes  that  can be confidently predicted  to occur  in institutions  and countries
that are technologically  more advanced.
G-  10 countries  need  to set up (and therefore  may  be expected  to establish)  three
separate  but complementary  information  subsystems. These subsystems  would
respectively  track:  (a)  the market values of securities  that trade  in secondary  markets;  (b)
changes  in the repayment  prospects  of loans; and eventually  (c)  the effects  of changes  in
interest  rates  and  foreign-exchange  rates on the value  of the institution  and its economic
income. As they  build  shese  subsystems,  economic  efficiency  dictates  that the valuation21
and rstk-analysis  software  they use be made accessible  to bank examiners  in differ-nt
countries  and responsive  to the dynamics  of financial-institution  balanlce  sheets.
In the meantime,  supervisors  in developing  countries  can usefully  be encouraged
to develop  information  systems  that are compatible  with the PDV methods  of bank capital
appraisal  described  in section II. For each of the major portfolio  categories  a bank's
balance  sheet  and income  statements  delineate, top managers  can be asked under  penalty
of fraud  to project,  defend,  and discount the range of cash flows they deem likely  to
accrue.
Concentrating  on Tdentifving  and TraCking  the Changing Value of Problemn  Loans
Within  the U.S., state and federal regulators  share  information  about the loars and
investments  that their respective  bank examiners  classify  adversely. International  sharing
of supervisory  information  is equally important  and already occurs  to some  extent
through  the Bank  for International  Settlements  (BIS). The World Bank and BIS should
explore  opportunities  to extend the scope  of this information  sharing to a broader  group
of countries.
More generally,  the World Bank or BIS might speed up the spread  of the needed
information  systems  and coordinate  supervisory  standards  across  developing  countries  in
three  ways. First, they could become  producers  of internationally  transferable  credit-
analysis  and  regulatory  information  protocols  and valuation  software. Second,  on an
international  or regional  basis, they  could serve  as forums  for negotiating  itemization  and
valuation  rules that would  use expert software  to recognize  incipient  loss accruals  and to
assign  accruing  losses to specific  bank stakeholders. Third, they  could test and
disseminate  risk  infornation to help the financial-services  industry  to set up a global
secondary  market  for developing-country  loans. Enhancing  the liquidiLy  of these  loans
would  tend  to reduce  prescriptive  levels of capital  requirements  for banks  in developing
countries  and the cost of capital  to customers  of these banks.
In the years to come,  these institutions  could usefully  disseminate  a range of
valuation  and  credit-analysis  models  that follow  behavioral  scoring models  in being
conceived  as methods  for analyzing  pertinent information  reported in credit-application
data,  credit-bureau  or credit-rating  files, and payment  records. These models  should
strive  to follow  U.S. software  systems in planning  to employ  scoring  models  to predict  a
customer's  disposition  to pay back a loan when and as it becomes  delinquent. The22
resulting  scores  can be used as a basis both for establishing  loss reserves  and for fine
tuning  collection  efforts  (i.e., "dunning"  activity) to the probable  responsiveness  of
various  customer  subsets.
Timely  problem-loan  identification  turns on tracking  the changing  probability  of
default  &fl  a loan has been made. In the U.S., software  for tracking  this probability  is
evolving  out of credit-scoring  and debt-collection  softwar.  Risk scoring  for loan
recovery  is not fundamentally  different  from the risk scoring that is undertaken  during  a
bank's  initial underwriting  process. It is natural for banks to repeatedly  re-feed  changing
economic  conditions,  legal  constraints,  and borrower  circumstances  into the loan  scoring
framework  as each loar  noves forward  through time. Doing this will ultimately  provide
an operational  way of implementing  market-value  accounting  for bank loans.
TV. Political Emhracahi1itX!  Better Tnform2tion  SyXstems  As a ResDlonse  to Market
Pressures Faced by RegulatorX Enterprises
Financial  regulation  is a service  that regulated  institutions  value for the benefits  of
confidence  and convenience  it confers  on customers  who use their products  (Kane, 1988).
Regulators  do not and cannot  autonomously  command  and control  the behavior  of the
"client"  institutions  they  regulate. Rather,  each regulator's  panel of control instruments.  is
shaped  by prior conditioning  and ex post feedback  from the parties  it regulates  (i.e.,  its
"regulatees").  To survive,  a control must be voluntarily  accepted  by regu!atees  in the
long run. Unacceptable  controls  lead regulatees  and their  competitors  to engage  in
"regulatory  arbitrage"  that effectively  transfers  market  share from inefficient  to efficient
regulators. In developing  countries,  regulatory  arbitrage  typically  shifts business  from
regulated  firms to less-formal  underground  institutions  (Germides,  Kessler,  and Meghir,
1991)  and to offshore entities.
The existence  of competing  regulatory  arrangements  supports  a long-run
voluntariness  in regulatory  relationships  that creates strategic  parallels  between  operating
a regulatory  agency and operating  an ordinary  business. To succeed  in the long run,  even
a regulatory  enterprise  must deliver a quality product  at a fair price. Emphasizing  this
point  may help  the World Bank  and BIS to make the information  systems  recommended
here more  palatable  to supervisory  authorities  in developing  countries.23
The Concent of a Regulatnr's  P
The equivalent  of the  2d=  of a regulatory system is the net buden it places  on its
regulatees. This net burden  differs  from the "gross burden"  of regulation  in two  ways.
First, it subtracts  out the benefits  in customer confidence and transactional  efficiency  that
the regulatory  system  confers  on its regulatecs. Second,  it further  eliminates  whatever
cos.. of operating  the regulatory  svstem  can be successfully  shifted  to unwary  taxpayers.
As a price, each  regulator's  net burden responds over time  to opportunities  for
substitution. Competition  from  differentially  regulated institutions  and other  market
forces lead regulated  parties  to do two things: (1) to push for less-burdensome  rules and
(2) to adapt their economic  strategy  and organizational  form to reduce  the opponunity
costs that tht regulation  would  create for their firms if managers  were to comply  with
existing rules zrindkessly.  For this reason, the cost of inefficient  regulation  tends  ovcr
time to shift from  cos, of strict  "compliance"  to costs of undertaking  efficient  regulatory
arbitrage. In turn, the cosi  nf regulatory  arbitrage is the cost of adapting  a regulatee's
product line,  productih nr  dist-iution systems, business  locations,  and corporate
structure  to make  it possible  to engage  in profitable activities from  which  the firm  would
otherwise  be excluded.
Net regulatory  burdens  differ drastically between strong  and weak  banks. Weak
banks  receive subsidies  from  deposit  insurance and less-formal  government  guarantees
that strong banks and  general  taxpayers  eventually help to pay for. In the U.S.,  the net
burden on strong  banks  has been  increasing  secularly in two respects. First,  social-
purpose regulation  (whose  benefits  are directed outside the industry)  has generated
increasing  paperwork. Second,  regulatory  efforts to retard the exit  of inefficient  and
insolvent  deposit  institutions  lower  the profit margins that strong  firms  can earn  on
borrowed  funds  and  push their  deposit-insurance  premiums  above  the value  of the
guarantee  services  these  low-risk  institutions  receive.
The counterparts  of social-purpose  regulation in developing  countries  are credit
allocation  policies  that  directly  subsidize  loans to preferred  sectors  and  individuals.  If
applied to weak  and  strong  banks  alike, World Bank promulgation  of standardized
schemes  for evaluating  bank  loans  would broaden the market for the equities  of banks It
developing  countries  (Cho,  1986)  and lessen a government's  abiiity  to subsidize
inefficient  borrowers  and crippled  institutions  in a h:dden  fashion.24
A reasonable  immediate  goal  for coordinated supervision  is merely  to agree  to
enforce much higher global  net regulatory  burdens for weak banks. To achieve  this goal,
it is enough to make sure  that all banks  hold positive enterprise-contributed  capital
without bothering  to calibrate  a precise  risk-weighting scheme to  justify variation  in the
enforcement  threshold  (Shadow  Financial  Regulatory Committee,  1989).  However,  if a
risk-weighted  threshold  is to be adopted,  it ought to embrace two  additional  goals. First,
it should seek to mieasure  the net regulatory  burden comprehensively  and  equalize  the
burden it lays on a nation's  strong  banks with that of competing  financial-services  firms.
Second, the system  should  seek  to equate the part of the burden  each nation's  banks  are
allowed to shift to taxpayers  with the benefits of the social-purpose  responsibilities  that
the government  specifically  asks  its banks to shoulder.
One way or another,  the law of one price tells us that market  pressures  on every
nation's banks and banking  regulators  will accomplish both types  of equalization  in the
long run. The question  is whether  this can be done without  first transferring  much  of
domestic banks'  financial-market  share  to foreign firms and other  domestic  financial
institutions. The key to speeding  up healthy regulatory and banking  market-structure
adjustments  in any  country  is to make  a crippled bank's  economic  insolvency  and  reliance
on taxpayer-contributed  capital  harder to cover up.
Co)nflicts  Between  Overt and Covert Ggals
Financial  regulators  make and  enforce rules. These rules restrain  the activities  of
individual  financial-services  firmns  (FSFs)  to generate overt and  hidden  benefits  for
various parties  in society. Regulators'  overt goals may be identified  as promoting  the
stability,  efficiency,  and fairness  of the financial industry. A regulatory  enterprise's
bureaucratic  interest  can be proxied  by its administrative  jurisdiction,  the  size of its
annual budget,  or the capitalized  value  of something akin to the enterprise's  net income.
Hidden benefits  typically  originate  in unresolved conflicts of interest  among  regulators
(including  politicians),  regulatees,  FSF customers, and ordinary  taxpayers.  These
conflicts of interest  generate  incentives  that explain antiegalitarian  redistributional
government  policies  that  enrich  some  politicians, some bureaucrats,  and/or  some
segments  of society  at the  expense  of society as a whole.
What society  views  as poor  regulatory  outcoli 1es sometimes  trace  to mistakes  by
misinformed  individual  regulators  and sometimes  to an unsavory  pursuit  of hidden25
agendas. Economic  analysis  can portray managers of a regulatory  enterprise  as
inaximizing  the goals  set by their overt mission, subject  to technological,  market,  and
statutory  restraints  aiid  to various principal-agent  conflicts. Such  a model  can also treat
individual  regulatory  enterprises  in different countries  or in different  financial-services
industries  as being  locked  in competition  with one another  for whatever  measure  of value
their managers  maximize  (Scott, 1977). An enterprise's  true objectives  may  embody
tradeoffs  between  the performnance  of its overt social mission,  its covert  bureaucratic  and
political  interests,  and its managers'  reputations and narrow  career  interests. To align
public-service  incentives  more  closely with taxpayer interests,  information  systems  for
mcnitoring  banks  in developing  countries must permnit  taxpayers  to monitor  more
effectively  the long-run  burdens  their agent regulators  actually  impose  upon  them.
Regulatory  Arbitrage as a Force for Net-Benerit Convergence
Around  the world,  financial  institutions  and markets  and concomitant  regulatory
systems  show  numerous  country-specific  features (Wilson,  1986;  Germides,  Kessler,  and
Meghir,  1991). Differences  in pattems of financial regulation  parallel  differences  in the
particular  economic,  political,  and bureaucratic deficiencies  and inefficiencies  that
regulation  is overtly  or covertly  expected to correct.
However,  the survival  of differences  in regulatory  patterns  is limited  by the
tendency  of private  capital  and loan-making  opportunities  to flow  to markets  and
institutions  that  offer the best  deals. The extent to which  net regulatory  burdens  on
financial  markets  and institutions  differ across countries  is na.Towed  by this regulatory
arbitrage. When  and  as technological  change in information  processing  and
telecommunications  lowers  the cost of tra.isacting  with foreign  entities,  adverse  flows of
capital and financial  deals  should  help to persuade a nation's  authorities  to lower  the net
burdens their  regulatory  framework  imposes on the savers,  investors,  and financial
intermediaries  that  transact  in its financial markets.
Recognition  that  exploitive  regulation drives depositors,  borrowers,  and other
bank stakeholders  to book  their business in foreign and less  regulated  or informal
domestic  markets  limits  the extent to which a country can set short-run  burdens  that
deviate  from  its society's  optimal  long-run path. For any  country,  the size of efficient
deviations  increases  with the opportunity  costs its citizens  would  face  in engaging  in
capital  flight. These  costs  evolve with information  costs, the volatility  of the real26
economy,  and the fluidity  of the political  environment. This knowledge  should  help the
World Bank  to convince  authorities  in developing countries  that  the infornation
revolution  that is underway  in finance today makes it short-sighted  and unfair  to adopt
policies that intentionally  or unintenti-naily permanently  subsidize  weak  banks.
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